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Investigating the Dilemmas of Ethical Social Research 
 
By Helen Johnson 
 
Abstract   
     The author’s work with a university ethics committee and field research in Pacific 
New Caledonia is used as a basis to problematise the biomedical research models used 
by universities in Australia for assessing social research as ethical. The article explores 
how culturally specific Western emotional bases for ethical decisions are often 
unexamined. It expresses concerns about gaps in biomedical models by linking the 
author’s description of field interactions with research participants to debates about the 
creation of knowledge. 
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Introduction 
How have my research experiences in Pacific New Caledonia shaped my 
thoughts about the ways that universities conceptualise ethical social research? In what 
ways can cross-cultural researchers contribute to broader debates in academia about 
ethical social research? Both questions are becoming increasingly urgent as Australian 
scholars engage in research with multicultural communities and across globalising yet 
locally different societies. This paper suggests that there is a problem with the ideas that 
frame ethical social research in the Western academy that can help scholars negotiate, 
but not fully resolve, the dilemmas that arise when conducting social research across 
cultures. 
I begin by problematising the concept of ethical social research used in 
Australian universities. I move to examine the ways that emotion as an organising 
category can be constructed in different cultures in order to suggest that university 
ethics committee members seldom acknowledge the cultural specificity of the 
emotional bases of their responses to, and decisions about, ethical social research. I 
then connect emotion to an analysis of gender, linking both to my research in Pacific 
New Caledonia. From my research I propose that Western theories of ethical social 
research require the flexibility to recognise the diversity of women’s discursive 
contexts across cultures. I make this proposal because women’s constructions, 
interpretations and assertions about how gender shapes their lived experiences are not 
only complex, sophisticated, and contextual but are embedded in intricate histories of 
shifting relations of power, particularly relative to the production of knowledge. To not 
recognise the diversity of women’s discursive contexts risks a further imposition of 
Western theories upon people whose voices are rarely acknowledged and heard. I 
conclude by presenting the implications and limitations of my proposal to social 
research practices. 
To initiate my discussion I examine the ways that Australian universities may 
limit notions of ethical social research by reducing dynamic and unpredictable social 
relations and discursive interactions to a static and inappropriate biomedical model. 
 
Universities and Biomedical Research Models 
I became aware of the potential for biomedical models to be used as a template 
for judging ethical social research during four years service with an Australian 
university ethics committee. When a new ethical problem arose the proposed research 
project committee members would turn to Australia’s National Health and Medical 
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Research Council’s (NH&MRC) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research 
Involving Humans (1999). The Statement has the authority to develop guidelines that 
are applicable to all research involving humans, a process that Susan Dobbs recognises 
as “appropriate and as contributing significantly to the culture of research ethics in 
Australia” (2000:19). While the guidelines provide a framework for considering how 
research should be conducted in general, they do not specifically address the ways that 
social research can be enacted across cultures. 
Given the Statement’s authority, why should social researchers problematise its 
basis in a biomedical model? I argued that a more effective model of ethical research 
should address the distinctive dilemmas of social research across cultures and should 
have a greater capacity to recognise and work with other people, particularly women, as 
active human agents. Mark Hobart has eloquently argued for “the value of treating local 
knowledges seriously and examining their potential contribution to peoples’ material, 
intellectual and general welfare” (1993:5). Yet Western political discourse frequently 
constructs indigenous women as disadvantaged. Indeed, Australia’s guide to the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) produced by the Office of the Status of Women argues that indigenous 
women, among other groups of women, “have special difficulties which require special 
action to compensate them” (1983:1). Yet Article 7 conveys a general call for 
“measures to eliminate discrimination against women in political and public life” 
(1983:2), and Article 11 “deals with employment, covers recruitment and promotion 
opportunities, conditions of employment and benefits, occupational health and safety 
…” (1983:3), while many others construct ‘women’ via a middle-class stereotype that 
has little or no relevance to indigenous women’s ways of being. The Articles reflect the 
perspectives, sensitivities and language of lawyers and political economists from arenas 
where men hold overwhelming and formal power. As indigenous women’s perspectives 
and input are missing CEDAW can serve to reinforce dominant Western relations of 
power and knowledge-production. 
Although fellow ethics committee members frequently expressed disquiet about 
the type of power relations that may develop between a researcher and their 
participant(s), sadly, their reliance on the NH&MRC’s National Statement meant their 
concerns remained predicated on a biomedical model of a powerful, educated, scientist 
from an advanced industrial society imposing upon a helpless research subject. In 
contrast, many Oceanic scholars argue that indigenous peoples frequently contest 
inadequate Western research theories and practices, and that non-Western women ‘talk 
back’ against shallow theories of their social power (Huggins 1998, Moreton-Robinson 
2000, Tuhiwai Smith 1999). University ethics committee members must therefore 
question privileging the Western researcher as sole knowledge-maker, which sustains 
the presumption that all women in non-Western communities are always powerless. 
Chandra Mohanty has argued eloquently against Western feminist constructions of 
women of colour as “normed on a white, Western (read progressive/modern)/ non-
Western (read backward/traditional) hierarchy [which freezes] third world women in 
time, space, and history” (1991:6). She chides limited perceptions that “exhaust the 
meaning of women’s day-to-day lives [and collapse] the everyday, fluid, fundamentally 
historical and dynamic nature of the lives of third world women” (1991:6). 
Emma Zapata provides examples of the dynamic and fluid nature of socially 
oppressed women’s lives and their power, proposing, “power cannot be studied as an 
abstraction or an isolated event. Self-empowerment, the capacity for power, is a 
complex process, as [a] woman can change, go back, halt on the way, reflect, look 
behind, think and go on” (in Townsend et al 1999:151). Conversely, Catherine Lutz 
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problematises the advantaged researcher when writing about Ifaluk perceptions of her 
as a needy female (1988:32 – 34). She shows how anthropologists may be supplicants 
for knowledge rather than scientists who impose their knowledge on others through 
relations of power in which they always remain privileged. Furthermore, I have argued 
that it is necessary to recognise participants, not as subjects of research or as ‘others’, 
but as people who may wish to contribute, who may consider themselves empowered 
by their narrativisations about themselves and their community. Participants who 
become friends may want to be acknowledged as collaborators in the production of 
knowledge, and people do have the capacity to walk away from an irritating researcher 
when they become annoyed, busy, or bored (Johnson 2000). Arguments from these 
standpoints produced a paragraph that was included in my former university’s proforma 
consent form to enable participants to choose to be named as a contributor or 
collaborator. Nonetheless, this small change to the biomedical research model used 
does not provide a framework to examine the power of the researcher to shape the 
project and its findings. Nor does it address the significant issues of the culturally 
different constructions of emotion and the cultural specificity of Western emotions in 
decisions about what constitutes ethical social research. 
 
How Do Cultural Constructions of Emotion Shape Perceptions of Ethical Social 
Research? 
 
Talk about emotions is simultaneously talk about society – about power and 
politics, about kinship and marriage, about normality and deviance. (Lutz 
1988:6) 
 
In the Western academy frameworks for ethical social research are constructed 
from a range of intellectually and socially appropriate emotional bases. For example, 
anthropology is anchored in a quest for scientific objectivity that stems from the desire 
of early twentieth century practitioners to establish the discipline as equal to the 
biomedical sciences that were gaining prestige at that time. Some aspects of 
anthropology have been reconstructed via interpretive and poststructural critiques 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986, Di Leonardo 1991, Wikan 1990 among many), and some 
theorists such as Kay Milton contend that researchers should work to “understand 
exactly what it means to objectify the things we analyse [precisely because science] is a 
process of interaction or engagement between scientist and object” (my emphasis 
1993:7). Nonetheless, by applying a biomedical model of scientist interacting with 
object-of-knowledge, ethics committees can produce social research models that 
construct an antinomy between researcher and researched rather than enable a 
knowledge-production relationship to evolve. 
But let me take Milton’s idea one-step further. The very process of 
interaction/engagement between scientist and object-of-knowledge can be questioned 
when the ‘object’ is female, for gendered, cross-cultural, and academic relations of 
power are crucial to understanding a woman’s performative context: the what, how, 
why and when she is articulating her ideas, her subjectivity, her sense of who she is in 
relation to others. As a consequence I propose it is more helpful to engage with the 
work of feminist anthropologists such as Lila Abu-Lughod (1990, 1993), who 
privileges her research participants’ expressions and, with Lutz (1988, 1990), focuses 
on how discourses of ethics acquire precedence over discourses of gender. In arguing 
that emotion is not a universal mode of feeling but has a socioculturally discursive 
character they problematise the interplay between Western biomedical constructions of 
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ethical social research, the social constitution of emotions, gendered relations of power, 
and academic processes of knowledge-production. Australia’s preferred biomedical 
models of ethical social research do not recognise cross-cultural differences in the 
social and cultural construction of emotions as they are based on a preference for 
distanced scientific objectivity. Nor do Australia’s preferred models recognise how 
gender may shape the researcher’s field practices and participants’ ways of being and 
responses to the researcher. As Abu-Lughod contends, the predominant Western 
intellectual model of scientific objectivity assumes “emotions can be detached in 
meaning and consequences from the flow of social life” (1990:25). Her alternative is to 
conceptualise emotion as discursive practice, to analyse “how emotion discourses are 
deployed in social contexts”, to focus on practice rather than meaning, and to pay 
attention to “the place in social and political life of what is said” (Abu-Lughod 1990:27, 
28, 33). 
Lutz’s work supports Abu-Lughod’s focus on discursive practice and connects the 
organising category gender to that of emotion, contributing to a problematisation of the 
ways both categories may intersect in Western scholarly analyses.1 Arguing that 
emotion is, in Western thought, predominantly associated with ‘the female’, Lutz 
contends, “any discourse on emotion is also, at least implicitly, a discourse on gender” 
(1990:69). The notion that emotion should be controlled, as biomedical models assume 
will be the case when a researcher is interacting with participants in the field, is linked 
via popular culture discourse to the parallel discourse of the control of sexuality. It is 
the rhetoric of control, Lutz asserts, that “directs attention away from the socially 
constructed nature of the idea of emotion” (1990:72). The Western definition of 
emotion as something inside an individual provides, she suggests, “an important 
symbolic vehicle by which the problem of the maintenance of social order can be 
voiced” (1990:73). Both Lutz and Abu-Lughod propose that researchers should 
perceive emotional discourse as “a form of social action that creates effects in the 
world, effects that are read in a culturally informed way by the audience for emotion 
talk” (1990:12). It is then possible to perceive how non-Western notions of emotion and 
effect in the world can contest Western judgments (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990:16) and 
lead to the progressive recognition that research participants feel and respond in a range 
of ways. 
Like feminist scholars critical of scientific objectivity’s potential for reification in 
social research (Alcoff 1993, Harding 1998), Lutz contends “the problem of the 
referential and reified view of language is found in even more extreme form in the 
domain of emotion words than it is elsewhere in language” (1988:9). She maintains that 
interpreting and translating emotions across cultures is fraught with the difficulties of 
presenting others as ‘sensible’ yet not succumbing to a reductive universalism, and 
quotes Jean Briggs (1970) and Vincent Crapanzano (1980) to propose that 
anthropologists make explicit the ways in which fieldwork is both “shocking and 
fascinating, comforting and disturbing [as one learns about] the immense and elaborate 
ethnopsychological belief system[s]” that shape everyday interactions (1988:11). Lutz 
concludes it is the emotional worldview of the anthropologist that demands attention 
because it is “to this emotional self that we implicitly compare the emotional lives of 
others” (1988:12). 
Recognising that one has an emotional self, and acknowledging the emotional 
selfhood of research participants is, I propose, important for Western knowledge-
production. The problems of not acknowledging either possibility became important to 
me when I attended an Australian bioethics conference at which a male philosopher 
presented an ethical conundrum. He proposed that Bosnian soldiers would experience 
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an ethical dilemma when faced with the choice about whether or not they should rape 
enemy women in the course of enacting their military duty. The example turned on the 
consciousness of the male soldiers and the ways in which they could or could not 
justify their actions. As the philosopher continued his presentation I became profoundly 
disturbed. At no stage did he address the range of emotions that women may experience 
as subjects of militarised sexual violence. He did not examine the soldiers’ potential for 
emotional response, his own emotional preferences as an academic framing this 
particular problem, nor did he problematise the threat to women’s psychoemotional 
condition contained in his example. His presentation also suggested that he had no 
inkling of how gendered relations of power, enacted within and across cultures, were 
shaping his perception of ethics. The philosopher’s example presented rape as 
acceptable military male practice within which the ethical issue became how men 
perceived themselves in relation to the label of rapist, and his intellectual 
preconceptions about women created them as objects for male self-knowledge and 
‘social’ knowledge-production. 
Recognising the ways that emotion is interwoven with the complex and gendered 
meaning systems generated by the social interactions of researchers and participants is 
significant. Lutz’s ideas therefore have ramifications for the ways that ethics 
committees judge researchers whose projects are to be enacted in multicultural and 
non-Western societies. If particular sociocultural forms of emotion shape researchers’ 
subjectivity and emotion is imbricated in the relations of power that structure cross-
cultural research, gender should be central to Western debates about ethical social 
research. 
 
Gender in Pacific New Caledonia 
New Caledonia, an archipelago comprising the main island (called Kanaky by 
its indigenous inhabitants), the Isle of Pines (Kunié), and the Loyalty Islands, is one of 
two French overseas territories in the south Pacific - the other is French Polynesia 
(Tahiti). Kanak peoples’ 32 languages and customs continue to thrive despite 
unfavourable conditions created by 150 years of French colonisation. The descendents 
of the initial wave of French convicts, later French settlers (les Caldoches), and 
continuing territorial administration by metropolitan French bureaucrats maintain 
French presence, with descendents of Vietnamese and Javanese migrant contract 
labourers and Wallisian and Futunan Islanders forming new communities. 
During postdoctoral research in New Caledonia I found myself urging New 
Caledonian women to narrate their lived experiences as I sought to learn how they 
created active cultural agency within a framework of profound social change. In 
particular I worked with indigenous Kunié women of the Isle of Pines. Through 
ongoing discussions about out-migration of family members to the capital, their views 
about ancestors, kinship relations that were changing due to processes of 
modernisation, and their succession plans for household goods and land, Kunié women 
taught me how they strategise to ensure that their interests are incorporated into 
community decisions (Johnson 2002). Later research with Vietnamese-Caledonian 
women and men in the capital Nouméa, whose narratives were profoundly shaped by 
‘emotional’ descriptions of migration and diaspora, alerted me to the ways that people 
in their community used life stories to cohere past remembrances with present life 
experiences, how they have been compelled to evolve new ways of thinking in order to 
negotiate the fragmentation of their families and social networks through migration, 
forced relocation and war, and how they gender their perceptions of being individuals 
within a community (Johnson. In press). 
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I also learnt that it would be easy to perceive New Caledonian women as 
disempowered in relation to the intervention of French administrative authorities and 
patriarchal family and/or clan structures in their daily lives. But the combined authority 
of Mohanty’s (1991) critique of Western feminist constructions of non-Western women 
as defenceless and women’s discursive counter narratives persuaded me that such a 
perception would be intellectually arrogant and would deny women’s resilience and 
resistance to the ways in which gender and power shaped their ways of being. Three 
anecdotes from my field research may better illustrate what I mean. 
 
Friendships in the field and the distress of narration 
While a Visiting Scholar at the French University of the Pacific, I met Justine, a 
woman of Vietnamese heritage who has since become a close friend. I have visited her 
home during every trip to Nouméa: staying with her family, accompanying her on 
outings, remaining in contact via email on my return, meeting with her when she visits 
Australia. During our interactions, as with many other social relations engendered by 
my field research, we worked toward what Ardra Cole and J. Gary Knowles describe as 
the “co-creation of a conversational space” in which we shared views, stories and 
perceptions as women (2001:29). 
Justine’s stories, and those of her family members, stimulated my desire to 
extend my research to the broader diasporic Vietnamese-Caledonian community. Over 
time I began to recognise how her family’s migration experiences were both common 
to and emblematic of the changes occurring in the Vietnamese-Caledonian community 
at the turn of the 21st century (Johnson. In press). In 2001 I returned. I noted that, as 
with Kunié research participants, Vietnamese-Caledonians created ‘story’ as a socially 
appropriate way to express perceptions, describe lived experiences, and organise a 
collective and subjective sense of sociality. But their narratives also created ethical 
dilemmas for me about how I should interact with and write about their experiences. 
During my last visit Justine was enduring a family crisis. I remember meeting her one 
afternoon when we sat in her office, both in tears at the injustice of her situation, as she 
explained the latest development. She told me 
 
My father has dismissed me from my position in one of our family companies. 
I’ve worked there for 27 years, and ensured we were in profit every year, even 
though it was the most difficult of our businesses. He’s only doing it because I 
have rebelled against his wishes and begun to live with my lover, who is not 
Vietnamese. 
 
On my return to Australia, I was torn between the need to protect her privacy (which I 
have done here by renaming her and limiting details of her profession) while wishing to 
describe the appalling effects of patriarchal actions on her life and career in the twenty-
first century (Johnson. In press). 
A further example illustrates the ethical dilemmas created from friendships that 
developed from my project. Some descendents of Vietnamese contract labour migrants 
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had returned to Tonkin (North 
Vietnam) during the voluntary repatriation of the community from New Caledonia in 
the 1960s. Their stories of flight from North Vietnam’s ensuing ‘war with the 
Americans’, their loss of family members as boat people travelling along the south 
China coast to the Hong Kong relocation camps, and the difficulties they endured 
reinserting themselves into New Caledonian society twenty years later meant that many 
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Vietnamese participants recounted their stories with tears in their eyes. Having been 
introduced to them through Justine’s network and having built a rapport during long 
sociable lunches or gracious meandering afternoon conversations, I found myself 
interacting with research participants who were visibly distressed by the process of 
remembering. For example, Eric told me how the outbreak of the war between the north 
and the south ‘exploded’ his family. 
 
Because they were forced to choose between taking Vietnamese or French 
nationality, and chose French, they were considered by the South Vietnamese 
authorities to be unpatriotic, and were consequently forced to leave their home 
country. Every member left for a different part of the world: the United States, 
France, New Caledonia. I was, at that time, at an age when I would have had to 
fulfil my military service, and this would have entailed fighting against North 
Vietnam. Because my village was situated so close to the border I considered 
this to be a demand that I fight against my own people. So I refused and left for 
France with a one-way visa that barred my return home.  
 
Eric ensured that I understood the significance of his story. He checked my notes to 
make certain that I had correctly written his father’s name and that of his family’s 
village. He wanted my record to be accurate. He then related to me 
 
My father had owned and managed an automechanic’s garage, which was 
judged to have the requisite facilities to manufacture armaments such as Sten 
guns. The colonial French authorities in IndoChina would not authorise 
Vietnamese people to manufacture arms because they reasoned that the arms 
would then be used against them. One of the many South Vietnamese 
religious/political sects of local combatants against the French that was in 
existence at that time demanded that my father manufacture clandestine 
weapons for them. He refused and was subsequently kidnapped. Although my 
mother sold our home and all the family’s possessions to raise the ransom, and 
paid the kidnappers, my father was assassinated. 
 
Eric’s narrative, as with many others, impelled me to consider how I could 
negotiate people’s sometimes painful responses to my quest to create cross-cultural 
knowledge. Kunié women, and Vietnamese-Caledonian women and men, taught me 
about the ways that gender, emotion, and global/local relations of power shaped their 
lived experiences. They also alerted me to their kind of power. Justine told me of her 
resistance to patriarchal power by building her life in dynamic new ways. Kunié 
women were proficient in the profound care and pathways of respect that are required 
to build relationships within their small societies, and showed me how these qualities 
could not be applied intellectually but must be genuinely felt and practiced. And, 
participants like Eric taught me that affinities can develop through genuine and 
mutually rewarding relationships and that research can benefit from interactions 
between people who have become friends. However, I also learnt that relationships 
launched from a basis of friendship can create ethical dilemmas. 
When I first arrived at Vao, the sole village on the Isle of Pines, to live among a 
Kunié family I spent time slowly blending into the community. Marie-Jeanne (my 
elderly Kunié host who died in 1998) and I would take long walks, travel to outlying 
gardens by outrigger canoe, and attend religious services. She helped me obtain 
permission to attend community meetings and events, supported me when I asked the 
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women in the family compound to enquire of their kin members and friends whether 
they would be interested in talking with me, and understood when I explained that I did 
not want women to feel pressured through kin obligation. I described my project in 
clear terms, telling people I met that I wanted to learn about their community, and their 
beliefs and practices, so that I could teach young people in Australia about how they 
lived. Most appeared comfortable with my explanation and reaffirmed my project, “if 
you don’t tell them, how would they know?” I established open-forum talk sessions in 
the afternoons, leaving word-of-mouth to advise people they were being held. Many 
curious people came and moved on, others stayed to listen, a few were permanent 
members of our small group. One afternoon Marie-Jeanne’s cousin Adi arrived at the 
compound. Prompted by my questions and Marie-Jeanne, Adi recounted aspects of her 
life story. She told me 
 
I came to live in the village from my lands in the northwest of the island 
because I wanted my daughter to go to school. I never wanted to be married to a 
man who drank alcohol like many other men here and I worked hard to avoid 
that. But my marriage ended in divorce because he began to drink heavily some 
years after we married. He changed so much. I left him to come here and to 
build my house at the end of the village, near [a French tourist hotel]. I cared for 
my daughter alone she has now left home to work in a tourist resort nearby. 
 
After describing the difficulties she had endured in her marriage due to her husband’s 
alcoholism and infidelities, Adi started to weep. I was troubled. During my doctoral 
research in southern France a number of elderly women wept in response to my 
questions but, as I had lived in their village for many months, most were secure with 
showing emotion when talking with me, and laughed at their tears. Adi was different. I 
had not met her before, she was a guest of my host and, being relatively new to the 
community, I was at a loss to know how best to comfort her. After some minutes she 
stopped and I advised her she did not have to continue talking with me if she did not 
wish to do so. This was the recommended response according to my university’s ethics 
committee protocol. Adi nodded, conversed with her cousin in Kunié then left shortly 
thereafter. But for the rest of my stay she avoided me. 
 
Implications for Ethical Social Research 
How can social researchers avoid distressing (if at all) people such as Adi? And 
what ethical responsibility do we have? Because people’s narratives can generate 
distress for the narrator and ethical dilemmas for the researcher, the respect and 
sincerity of purpose that Cole and Knowles (2001) propose is a necessary but not 
sufficient framework for ethical social research. Although Adi’s physical expression of 
distress taught me that how my research participants (and I) felt could become more 
important than how I thought as a researcher focused on obtaining data, I also learnt 
that physical expression of distress, particularly women’s tears, can be conceptualised 
as a potent means of communication.2 Dee Graham et al argue that male violence 
against women drives “the occurrence of women’s seemingly irrational behaviours” 
(1994:xv). As a solution they propose that we imagine a world of relationships “based 
on mutuality rather than dominance and subordination” (1994: xvii). Their insights can 
be linked to those of Kumari Jayawardena and Malathi de Alwis who contend that 
violence is the momentary expression of a “long history of complex human 
relationships imbricated in constantly shifting nexuses of power” (1996:9), and that 
expressing emotion is not pathological.3 They also prompt power in research relations 
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to be understood as a complex manifestation of cross-cultural social relations not just 
between ‘researcher/researched’ but also the structures, histories and ongoing struggles 
that many women endure in order to survive in a difficult world. Furthermore, Adi’s 
response suggests that, even though most researchers do not enjoy distressing their 
research participants, emotion cannot and should not be completely avoided. However, 
the imagination and creation of relational mutuality is not sufficient for the practice of 
ethical social research for it does not recognise the power that is derived from being a 
tertiary-educated researcher, nor adequately deal with the issues generated by gender 
and a lack of understanding of different emotional ways of being across cultures. 
Given the complex issues generated by considerations of gender and emotion in 
cross-cultural social research how can universities problematise biomedical models that 
presently limit the conceptualisation and practice of ethical social research? Field 
research has taught me the value of describing in detail and interpreting the diverse and 
vibrant subjectivities of people in cultures not my own to ensure they can best explain 
their modes of being and thinking. I continue to work to fashion frames and content that 
best correspond to and enable participants’ insights to be expressed. Learning how to 
practise participant observation as a kind of ‘descriptive interpretation’ has been a 
valuable lesson in research skills, but it was my engagement with Kunié and 
Vietnamese-Caledonian people that taught me to validate the care, respect, and 
collaboration required to interpret their stories. They were presenting a gift of 
themselves to me and to others beyond their island home and teaching me how 
‘knowledge’ could be mutually constituted. But, as the above examples suggest, the 
creation of field relationships also produced ethical dilemmas. 
Anthropologists have worked to negotiate some of the dilemmas they encounter. 
Many cross-cultural studies counter the tendency to disembody ‘others’ in theoretical 
hypostatis by framing their findings within an awareness of participants’ reactions, by 
providing a description of how the research was undertaken, and by revealing how their 
methodology has been constituted in relation to disciplinary expectations (Cameron 
1998, Sheper-Hughes and Sargent 1998, Watkins 1996, Weiss 1998). Hobart suggests 
treating knowledge “not as some abstract conceptual system, but as situated [local] 
practices” (1993:4). Cole and Knowles (2001) write of the ethical principles they 
devised to guide their life history research. Contesting Seidman’s (1991) view that 
rapport between researcher and participant should be controlled so that data is not 
negatively distorted, they argue for authentic emotions of care, sensitivity and respect 
(2001:44). Meira Weiss (1998) offers a slightly different yet still compelling 
perspective. When researching parents’ difficulties in adjusting to ‘appearance-
impaired’ children in Israel, on many occasions she observed behaviour she considered 
abusive. But the ethical options anchored in anthropology as a discipline were limited. 
Weiss noted that two male researchers chose not to act when encountering 
behaviours they considered abhorrent. Concurring with Seidman’s view that “the best 
thing to do is nothing” (1991:82), they counselled noninterference and advised that 
taking responsibility for research participants’ wellbeing was inappropriate. Weiss 
protests, “the imperative of ‘field neutrality’ – like a powerful conditioning imprinted in 
an early and critical period – [it] dictates anthropology’s epistemological and moral 
stances” (1998:157). She chose instead to document the child abuse she observed as a 
preventative measure. Her self-reflexive ethnographic representation details how, as a 
caring woman, she was wounded by the harsh behaviour she observed. Viewing the 
demeaning effects of social abuse on the children concerned, she was unable to 
continue research that had become, for her, unethical. 
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Weiss linked gender and emotion with an examination of power relations to work 
towards the creation of ethical knowledge. She chose to respond to her feelings about 
the practices she observed, contradicting the established code of neutral field practice. 
Weiss’ rigorous scrutiny of her sense of unease invoked what Megan Boler has termed 
a “semiotics of empathy” (1999:157). Although Martha Nussbaum has distinguished 
‘empathy’ from ‘compassion’, arguing that empathy “is simply an imaginative 
reconstruction of another person’s experience, whether that experience is happy or sad, 
pleasant or painful or neutral” (2001:302), Weiss writes that she felt compelled to 
examine the interrelations of her emotion with social relations of power as part of her 
empathetic response. 
Weiss’ response is significant because it suggests there is no single clear 
pathway to ethically produce knowledge from social research. Nussbaum has argued 
for empathy as being “highly relevant to compassion” (2001:330,333) and requiring “a 
notion of responsibility and blame” (2001:314). My research has taught me to take 
responsibility for the knowledge I produce by situating, as best I can, the narratives of 
different women in their sense of community relations and interpersonal subjectivity, to 
elucidate how I have interpreted the insights I have gained into their ways of being, to 
acknowledge the contributions of people with whom I create knowledge, to clarify how 
my perceptions are refracted through the constantly varying prism of cross-cultural 
theory, to illuminate how social research relations are shaped within my participants’ 
emotions and their complex nexus of power relations, and how social research relations 
are “fraught with history, contingency, and struggle” (see Mani in Grewal and Caplan 
1994:149, Kaplan 1994; Smith 1988). But is this sufficient? 
Researchers can recognise that we have an emotional self, can acknowledge the 
emotional selfhood of our research participants, and can blend an empathetic response 
born of field relations with participants to a critical analysis of the historical struggles 
that have created the rigid dichotomies between ‘us’ and ‘them’, to develop, as Celia 
Rothenberg writes, “a continuum of experience and identification with those with 
whom we do research” (1999:37). Also, research practices that link gender with 
emotion and power in order to create ethical knowledge can acknowledge that speaking 
nearby, or next to, or together with a collaborative participant can open opportunities 
for different people’s voices to be heard in a domain of mutual respect (Alcoff and 
Potter 1993, Caplan 1993, Cuthbert 2000, Johnson 2000, Rothenberg 1999). And, a 
reflection upon the dilemmas produced by conceptualising and performing cross-
cultural social research in an ethical manner has implications for tertiary teaching 
practices, particularly in research skills and methods courses where students’ awareness 
of how ethics are socioculturally constructed, and the different ethical issues that can 
arise within and across cultures, should be stimulated. Finally, the linkage of gender, 
emotion and power may also enable cross-cultural researchers to use the knowledge 
that research participants have helped them create to educate university ethics 
committee members, to broaden their conceptualisation of non-Western peoples, and to 
question privileging the Western researcher as sole knowledge-maker. 
These suggestions have the utopian yet necessary potential to broaden 
understandings of people’s ways of being, thinking, and feeling beyond the comfort 
zone of a researcher’s own community. Nevertheless, they do not resolve all the 
dilemmas inherent in conceptualising and enacting ethical social research. It may be 
impossible to conduct ‘pure’ ethical knowledge, in that academic research relations are 
inherently loaded in favour of those with exceptional education. Academics do have the 
power to control a research project and to (re)construct the narratives that appear on the 
printed page. Linking gender with emotion and power to create ethical social research 
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may promote empathy and identification with the people who have often given of their 
time, homes, hospitality and thoughts to collaborate in the creation of knowledge. And 
conceptualising research collaborators as active cultural agents, albeit often 
disadvantaged politically and economically, may broadcast to the wider community 
potential ways to overcome the easy slippage into hatred provoked by fear of 
difference, and the need to control others caused by the diverse range of vested interests 
within the global community. But scholars should never acquiesce to the belief that our 
ethical conceptualisations have resolved the complex dilemmas produced by our power 
as researchers in the field and writers in the academy, for what happens in practice is 
far more complex, variable and unpredictable than can be encapsulated by any single 
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1 In Amartya Sen and Susan Okin’s (1995) linkage of gender to justice they analyse how social 
constructions of gender can reinforce inequality, particularly in relation to women’s perceptions of and 
justification for their low status. 
2 I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer who made this point and stimulated my thinking about a 
number of related issues. 
3 I wish to thank again the anonymous reviewer who alerted me to this issue. 
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